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We propose a new approach to test of the null of full-information rational expectations which is informative
about whether rejections of the null reflect departures from rationality or full-information.  This approach
can also quantify the economic significance of departures from the null by mapping them into the
underlying degree of information rigidity faced by economic agents.  Applying this approach to both
U.S. and cross-country data of professional forecasters and other economic agents yields pervasive
evidence of informational rigidities that can be explained by models of imperfect information.  Furthermore,
the proposed approach sheds new light on the implications of policies such as inflation-targeting and
those leading to the Great Moderation on expectations.  Finally, we document evidence of state-dependence
in the expectations formation process.
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Expectations matter.  How much to consume or save, what price to set, and whether to hire or fire 
workers are just some of the fundamental decisions underlying macroeconomic dynamics that hinge upon 
agents’ expectations of the future.  Yet how those expectations are formed, and how best to model this 
process, remains an open question.  From the simple automatons of adaptive expectations to the all-
knowing agents of modern full-information rational expectations models, macroeconomists have 
considered a wide variety of frameworks to model the expectations formation process, yielding radically 
different results for macroeconomic dynamics and policy implications.  Recent work on rational 
expectations models with informational frictions such as Mankiw and Reis (2002), Woodford (2001), and 
Sims (2003) has emphasized how informational rigidities can account for otherwise puzzling empirical 
findings but these same frictions can also lead to policy prescriptions that differ from those under models 
with full-information.
1  Despite a growing body of work studying the implications of possible departures 
from full-information rational expectations, the empirical evidence against this assumption underlying 
most modern macroeconomic models has been limited.  In particular, while statistical evidence against 
the null is commonly uncovered, the economic significance of these rejections remains unclear. 
  Building from the predictions of rational expectations models with informational rigidities, we 
propose a novel approach to test the null of full-information rational expectations in a way that sheds new 
light on possible departures from the null.  Our baseline specification relates ex post mean forecast errors 
to the ex ante revision of the average forecast across agents.  While this specification is just a special case 
of the traditional test of full-information rational expectations (FIRE) in which one assesses whether 
previously available information can predict ex post mean forecast errors, our specification possesses 
multiple advantages over this traditional approach.
2  First, we rely on the predictions of theoretical models 
of informational rigidities to guide our choice of the relevant regressors.  This mitigates the data-mining 
concern associated with the traditional approach in which, after trying enough potential regressors, one is 
bound to reject the null of FIRE.  Second, models of informational rigidities make specific predictions 
about the sign of the coefficient on forecast revisions, so that our specification provides guidance not only 
about the null of FIRE but also about alternative models.  As a result, our framework can help determine 
                                                      
1 For example, Ball et al. (2005) show that price-level targeting is optimal in sticky-information models whereas 
inflation targeting is optimal in a sticky-price model.  Paciello and Wiederholt (2010) document how rational 
inattention as in Sims (2003) alters optimal monetary policy. Likewise, Mankiw and Reis (2002) argue that the 
observed delayed response of inflation to monetary policy shocks is not readily matched by New Keynesian models 
without the addition of informational rigidities or the counterfactual assumption of price indexation. Roberts (1997, 
1998) and Adam and Padula (2003) demonstrate that empirical estimates of the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips 
Curve have the correct sign when conditioning on survey measures of inflation expectations while this is typically 
not the case under the assumption of full-information rational expectations. Piazzesi and Schneider (2008), 
Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) and Bachetta et al. (2008) all identify links between systematic forecast errors in 
survey forecasts and puzzles in various financial markets. 
2 See Pesaran and Weale (2006) for a survey of this literature. 2 
 
whether rejections of the null should be interpreted as rejecting either the rationality of expectations or the 
full-information assumption.  Third, we show that the coefficient on forecast revisions maps one-to-one 
into the underlying degree of information rigidity.  Our approach can therefore not only test the null of 
FIRE against well-specified alternatives but also provide a metric by which to assess the economic 
significance of departures from the null of FIRE. 
Two theoretical rational expectations models of informational frictions motivate our empirical 
specification.  In the sticky-information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002), agents update their 
information sets infrequently as a result of fixed costs to the acquisition of information.  When they do 
update their information sets, they acquire full-information rational expectations.  The degree of 
information rigidity in this model is then the probability of not acquiring new information each period.  
The second class of models we consider consists of imperfect information models such as Woodford 
(2001), Sims (2003), and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009).  Here, agents continuously update their 
information sets but, because they can never fully observe the true state, they form and update beliefs 
about the underlying fundamentals via a signal extraction problem.
3  Strikingly, both models predict the 
same relationship between ex post mean forecast errors and the ex ante mean forecast revision such that 
the coefficient on forecast revisions depends only on the degree of information rigidity in each model.  
  The resulting empirical specification can be applied to study informational rigidities for a variety 
of economic agents such as consumers, firms, central banks and financial market participants for whom 
forecast data are available.  As a first step, we focus on inflation forecasts from the U.S. Survey of 
Professional Forecasters (SPF) for two reasons.  First, inflation forecasts have received the most attention 
in the literature so that these results are more readily comparable to previous work.  Second, because 
professional forecasters are some of the most informed economic agents, uncovering significant 
informational rigidities for these agents likely presents a lower bound on the importance of informational 
rigidities for other less-informed economic agents.  From 1969-2010, we can strongly reject the null of 
FIRE and find that the estimated coefficient on forecast revisions is positive, consistent with the 
prediction of rational expectations models incorporating informational rigidities.  Additional coefficient 
restrictions implied by these models cannot be rejected and past information incorporated in other 
economic variables loses much of its predictive power for ex post mean forecast errors once the forecast 
revision is controlled for.  Furthermore, the implied degree of information rigidity is high: in the context 
of sticky-information models, it implies an average duration of six to seven months between information 
updates, while in imperfect information models it implies that new information receives less than half of 
the weight that it would under full information when agents are updating their forecasts.  We document 
                                                      
3 Earlier work in this tradition includes Lucas (1972) and Kydland and Prescott (1982).  A related approach 
emphasizes differences in agents’ priors about parameter values rather than differences in information sets.  See for 
example Patton and Timmermann (2010).  3 
 
that qualitatively similar results obtain for different subsets of professional forecasters, such as academics, 
commercial banks, and non-financial businesses, as well as for consumers and financial market-based 
inflation expectations.  Thus, our results are unlikely to be driven by either strategic behavior on the part 
of professional forecasters or reputational considerations. 
  In addition, we apply our specification to a much broader set of forecasted macroeconomic 
variables.  First, the SPF includes historical forecasts for four other macroeconomic variables going back 
to 1968, including real GDP and unemployment, at multiple forecasting horizons.  Our approach can 
exploit both the multiple forecasting horizons and different macroeconomic variables, allowing us to 
extract more precise estimates of informational rigidities than in previous work.  Pooling across these 
variables and forecasting horizons leads to even stronger rejections of the null of FIRE, again in the 
direction predicted by models of informational rigidities.  Second, starting in 1981, the SPF includes 
forecasts of seven additional macroeconomic variables, again at multiple forecasting horizons.  Using this 
larger set of variables confirms the baseline finding: we can reject the null of FIRE in exactly the 
direction predicted by models with informational frictions and the estimates point to economically 
significant degrees of informational rigidities.  Third, we utilize an additional survey of professional 
forecasters constructed by Consensus Economics which includes quarterly historical forecasts since 1989 
of five macroeconomic variables for the G-7 and five additional industrialized countries, again at multiple 
forecasting horizons.  Pooling across these countries, variables and horizons, yields an almost identical 
coefficient on forecast revisions, providing further evidence that professional forecasters are subject to 
significant informational rigidities. 
  Our approach can also shed light on the relative merit of different models of informational 
rigidities.  For example, the sticky-information model implies a common rate of information updating for 
all macroeconomic variables, whereas imperfect information models imply that the degree of information 
rigidity associated with a macroeconomic variable should vary according to the persistence of each 
variable and the signal-noise ratio associated with it.  Across datasets, we find robust evidence that the 
degree of information rigidity varies systematically across macroeconomic variables and that this cross-
sectional variation is consistent with the predicted determinants of imperfect information models: the 
persistence of a variable and measures of the signal-noise ratio can account for about 20-30 percent of the 
variation in the estimated degree of information rigidity across countries and macroeconomic variables in 
the Consensus Economics dataset.  Thus, imperfect information models appear to be a reasonable 
description of the underlying expectations formation process for professional forecasters.   
  Because our empirical specification allows us to recover estimates of the underlying degree of 
information rigidity, we also consider some policy determinants of the expectations formation process.  
For example, the monetary policy changes enacted by Volcker contributed to the Great Moderation 4 
 
(Clarida et al. (2000), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2009)), the period of diminished macroeconomic 
volatility since the early to mid-1980s.  According to models with informational rigidities, such a decline 
in volatility should result in a higher degree of inattention.  We study the low-frequency time variation in 
the estimated degree of information rigidity among U.S. professional forecasters and find evidence that 
accords remarkably well with this intuition: the degree of information rigidity fell consistently throughout 
the 1970s and early 1980s when macroeconomic volatility was high, reaching a minimum around 1983-
84.  Since then, the degree of information rigidity has been consistently rising as macroeconomic 
volatility has been subdued.  One interpretation of this result could be that the changes in monetary policy 
enacted by Volcker helped stabilize the economy in the Great Moderation, but this economic stabilization 
also promoted greater inattention on the part of economic agents, thereby, in the end, making the 
economy more susceptible to economic shocks.  This suggests an additional mechanism, along with 
increased risk-taking on the part of financial market participants, through which the Great Moderation 
may have contributed to the severity of the Great Recession. 
  Our approach is also well-suited to evaluate and quantify the effect of policy or institutional 
changes on the expectations formation process.  To illustrate, we first study the effect of central bank 
independence on the expectations formation process and we find a strong positive relationship between 
central bank independence and information rigidity.  We also consider the adoption of inflation-targeting 
by central banks within our cross-country data, a policy explicitly expected to stabilize or “anchor” 
agents’ inflation expectations.  Such regimes should, if credible, increase inattention to inflation on the 
part of economic agents leading to lower volatility in expectations of future outcomes.  We find that the 
effect of adopting an inflation-targeting regime on the degree of inattention in inflationary expectations of 
professional forecasters is small and not statistically significant, casting doubt on the efficacy of this 
policy, at least among the already-stable set of countries in our sample.  This approach could readily be 
extended to a larger set of countries and other policy issues such as exchange rate regimes which are 
predicted to have important effects on expectations.  Thus, an additional contribution of the paper is to 
provide a framework for analyzing the effects of different policy regimes on the expectations formation 
process of economic agents. 
  While research on sticky information and imperfect information typically expresses these notions 
in a time-dependent setting, one might naturally expect large and visible shocks to affect the rate of 
information-acquisition and processing by economic agents, i.e. state-dependence should be characteristic 
in the face of large shocks as theoretically documented in Gorodnichenko (2008).  We consider this 
possibility by studying the time-variation in the degree of informational rigidities in two cases.  First, we 
estimate the average effect of recessions on the degree of information rigidity in the U.S. since 1969.  We 
find that the degree of information rigidity declines substantially after a few quarters of being in a 5 
 
recession and gradually recovers over time.  Second, we consider the natural experiment provided by the 
attack of September 11
th, 2001, which was an immediately recognizable and economically potent shock 
leading to large forecast revisions by professional forecasters thereafter.  Because of the visibility of this 
shock, one might expect that these forecast revisions would not have been subject to the same degree of 
informational rigidities as normal business cycle conditions.  Consistent with this prior, we find that 
professional forecasts in the U.S. and other countries were not subject to important informational 
rigidities shortly after the 9/11 shock.  In short, we document clear evidence of state-dependence in the 
expectations formation process in the presence of large economic shocks, a feature of the data which is 
not commonly incorporated into models of information rigidities. 
This paper is closely related to recent empirical work trying to ascertain the nature of the 
expectations formation process.  For example, Mankiw et al. (2004) assess whether a sticky-information 
model can replicate some stylized facts about the predictability of forecast errors by professional 
forecasters while Andolfatto et al. (2007) consider whether imperfect information with respect to the 
inflation target of the central bank can account for observed deviations from FIRE.  Khan and Zhu (2006), 
Kiley (2007), and Coibion (2010) assess the validity of sticky information using estimates of its predicted 
Phillips curve. One advantage of our approach is that we can directly recover an estimate of the degree of 
information rigidity without having to make auxiliary assumptions about the model, such as the nature of 
price-setting decisions.  Furthermore, our approach allows us to differentiate between sticky-information 
and imperfect information models.  Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2008) study the evidence for sticky-
information and imperfect information models but do so by estimating the response of forecast errors and 
disagreement to structural shocks whereas our approach does not require the identification of any shock. 
In the same spirit, Branch (2007) compares the fit of sticky-information and model-switching 
characterizations of the expectations formation process while Carroll (2003) tests an epidemiological 
model of expectations in which information diffuses over time from professional forecasters to 
consumers.  However, these papers focus almost exclusively on inflationary expectations whereas we 
utilize forecasts for a wide variety of macroeconomic variables as well as cross-country data.   
Furthermore, we study the deeper determinants of information rigidity such as the effects of 
macroeconomic volatility and institutions.   
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents the predicted relationship between ex post 
mean forecast errors and ex ante mean forecast revisions in sticky-information and imperfect information 
models.  Section 3 describes the empirical strategy and provides results for inflation forecasts of 
professional forecasters and other agents, as well as broader evidence from forecasts of other 
macroeconomic variables.  Section 4 presents evidence on the underlying macroeconomic and policy 6 
 
determinants of informational rigidities and documents a likely role for state-dependence in the 
expectations formation process.  Section 5 concludes. 
II  Forecast Errors, Forecast Revisions and Informational Rigidities 
In this section, we present two models of informational rigidities and derive their respective predictions 
for the relationship between ex post mean forecast errors and ex ante mean forecast revisions.   
2.1 Sticky  Information 
Mankiw and Reis (2002) proposed a model of inattentive agents who update their information sets each 
period with probability  1     but acquire no new information with probability  , so that   can be 
interpreted as the degree of information rigidity and 1/ 1    is the average duration between 
information updates.  When agents update their information sets, they acquire full information and have 
rational expectations.  Reis (2006) shows how this time-dependent updating of information sets obtains 
when firms face a fixed cost to updating their information.  The average time t forecast across agents (  ) 
of a variable   at time      is a weighted average of current and past full-information rational 
expectations forecasts (    ) of the variable such that  
          1    ∑           
∞
    .   (1) 
The average forecast at time t-1 can similarly be written as 
            1    ∑             
∞
       (2) 
which implies that the current average forecast is just a weighted average of the previous period’s forecast 
and the current rational expectation of variable   at time      
          1                       .   (3) 
Full-information rational expectations are such that 
                    ,    (4) 
where     ,  is the rational expectations error and is thus uncorrelated with information dated t or earlier.   
Combining (3) and (4) yields the predicted relationship between the ex post mean forecast error 
across agents and the forecast revision 
               
 
   ∆             ,    (5) 
where ∆                          .  Importantly, the coefficient on the forecast revision depends only 
the degree of information rigidity  .  In the special case of no informational frictions,   0  and the 
specification collapses to equation (4), i.e. the average forecast error is unpredictable using information 
dated t or earlier.  Because the sticky-information model implies a single rate of information acquisition, 7 
 
equation (5) holds for any macroeconomic variable and any forecasting horizon.
4  In addition, this 
specification will hold regardless of the structure of the rest of the model. 
2.2 Imperfect  Information 
We also consider models in which agents know the structure of the model and underlying parameter 
values, continuously update their information sets, but never fully observe the state.  This class of models 
includes most famously the Lucas (1972) islands model but also a wide variety of limited information 
settings considered in the literature.  For example, Kydland and Prescott (1982) assume that the level of 
technology reflects both permanent and transitory shocks but that agents cannot separately identify these 
two components.  More recently, Woodford (2001) considers an environment in which firms observe 
aggregate demand subject to idiosyncratic errors, which combined with strategic complementarity in 
price-setting, can account for the persistent effect of monetary policy shocks.  Suppose that a 
macroeconomic variable follows an AR(1) process 
                   (6) 
where 0   1 .  Agents cannot directly observe x but instead receive a signal   
  such that 
  
           
    (7) 
where   
  represents noise which may be correlated across agents.  Each agent i then generates optimal 
forecasts   
      given their information sets via the Kalman filter  
  
          
     1       
       (8) 
  
            
   ,  
where   is the Kalman gain which represents the relative weight placed on new information relative to 
previous forecasts.  When the signal is perfectly revealing about the true state,   1 ; while the presence 
of noise induces   1 .  Thus,  1    can be interpreted as the degree of information rigidity in this 
model.
5   
                                                      
4 Carroll (2003) proposes an epidemiological model of information diffusion in which consumers acquire rational 
expectations forecasts in a time dependent setting from occasional activities such as reading the newspaper.  It is 
conceivable in Carroll’s model for sticky information agents to have different rates of information updating for 
different macroeconomic variables since the full-information rational expectations are formulated by other agents.  
However, because we focus primarily on professional forecasters who do not have access to superior forecasts from 
other agents, we assume that these forecasters formulate the full-information rational expectations updates 
themselves.  Because the latter requires solving for all variables simultaneously, the rate of information updating 
must be common across variables.  The same logic applies for different forecasting horizons. 
5 In general, the persistence of macroeconomic variables is also a function of the degree of information rigidity.  We 
focus on the equilibrium outcome where the effect of information rigidity is fully incorporated in the persistence of 
the series.  Since the persistence of macroeconomic variables is increasing in information rigidities and the degree of 
information rigidity is decreasing in the persistence, there will be unique equilibrium levels of persistence and 
information rigidity in the model. 8 
 
Averaging across agents and rearranging, one can show that the following relationship between 
ex post mean forecast errors and ex ante mean forecast revisions holds when the average of the noise 
across agents is zero 
               
   
                ,    (9) 
where     ,    ∑       
 
     is the rational expectations error and F denotes the average forecast across 
agents.
6  Thus, while individual forecasts are optimal conditional on each agent’s information set, the ex 
post mean forecast error is systematically predictable using ex ante mean forecast revisions.  This 
specification is identical to that obtained under sticky-information, when  1    is interpreted as the 
degree of information rigidity.  In contrast to equation (5) derived under sticky information, the 
coefficient on forecast revisions need not be the same for different macroeconomic variables or forecast 
horizons in imperfect information models.  Instead, the coefficient will vary with the determinants of the 
Kalman gain, e.g. the persistence of the series and the signal-noise ratio.   
III  Tests of FIRE and New Evidence on Informational Rigidities 
This section a) describes our empirical strategy and relates it to previous literature; b) applies our 
approach to inflation forecasts of U.S. professional forecasters, consumers, and financial market 
participants; c) considers broader evidence of informational rigidities pooled across macroeconomic 
variables as well as d) cross-country evidence on informational rigidities. 
3.1  A New Approach for Assessing the Nature of the Expectations Formation Process 
The sticky information and imperfect information models both point to the same relationship between ex 
post mean forecast errors and ex ante mean forecast revisions such that the coefficient on forecast 
revisions maps one to one into the underlying degree of informational rigidities.  This relationship can be 
readily estimated for a given macroeconomic variable x, mean forecasts across agents Fx and forecasting 
horizon h using the following empirical specification: 
                                    (10) 
This specification is just a special case of the more general test of FIRE commonly employed in the 
literature in which the forecast error is regressed on a subset of the information available to agents at the 
time the forecast was made, i.e.  
                           .   (11)  
Under the null of FIRE, forecast errors (the LHS) should be uncorrelated with all past information (any 
variable z dated t or earlier) and should have a constant of zero.  Our empirical specification in contrast 
                                                      
6 When the average noise is nonzero, this introduces another component to the error term, dated time t and 
uncorrelated with information from   1  and earlier.  In this case, our baseline empirical specification cannot be 
estimated by OLS.  We generated equivalent results as those in the paper using instrumental variables dated by   1  
and earlier and reached nearly identical conclusions.  Hence, we focus on the simpler OLS case. 9 
 
imposes that the RHS variable be the revision in forecasts of the relevant time horizon.  Despite the fact 
that our specification appears to just be a special case of the more general test, it addresses several 
important shortcomings of traditional tests. 
The first limitation comes from the absence of any theoretical guidance in traditional applications 
of (11) as to which variables should be included on the RHS.  This leads to important data-mining 
concerns: if a researcher tries enough macroeconomic variables and lags thereof, the null hypothesis of a 
zero coefficient is bound to be rejected.  Consider a typical exercise applying (11) to inflation forecasts.  
Following much of the literature, we focus on mean inflation forecasts for the current and next three 
quarters from the Survey of Professional Forecasters from 1969 to 2010.  Forecast errors are constructed 
using forecasts made at the relevant date and real-time data available one year after the relevant date.  A 
common first step in the literature is to include the contemporaneous forecast of future inflation on the 
RHS of (11) to verify that the coefficient is zero, i.e. that forecasts are unbiased.  As shown in Table 1 
(Panel A), this yields estimates of the constant and   that are insignificantly different from zero, a finding 
which is consistent with the null of FIRE.  A reasonable second step is to introduce additional variables in 
professional forecasters’ information sets to determine whether this information has been fully 
incorporated in their forecasts, i.e. if forecasts are efficient.  Columns (2)-(5) of Panel A in Table 1 
present results from using real-time measures of inflation, 3-month Tbills, the change in real oil prices, 
and the unemployment rate, all lagged one quarter to ensure that these values were available to 
forecasters.  All four variables are statistically significant predictors of ex post mean forecast errors, 
contrary to the null of FIRE.  For three out of four, the coefficient on forecasts also becomes different 
from zero once these additional variables are included.
7   
Second, even if we observe a rejection of the null hypothesis that is not driven by data-mining, 
such a rejection is not directly informative about alternative models of the expectations formation process.  
Does the finding of predictive power from lagged inflation or unemployment point to a rejection of 
rational expectations and therefore possibly toward models with adaptive expectations or does it point to a 
rejection of the full-information assumption, as in sticky information or imperfect information models?  
In the absence of clear theoretical predictions from these models about the estimated coefficients in these 
empirical specifications, little insight about the expectations formation process is gained from statistical 
rejections of the null hypothesis. 
Third, and most fundamentally, these tests are uninformative about the economic significance of 
the results.  The assumption of FIRE is easy to disprove: as emphasized by Mankiw et al. (2003), the fact 
                                                      
7 This selection of variables is not a random sample but rather is deliberately based on previous evidence of 
departures from the null of FIRE identified in Thomas (1999), Mehra (2002), Mankiw et al. (2003) and Pesaran and 
Weale (2006). 10 
 
that economic agents systematically disagree about expected outcomes is inherently inconsistent with all 
agents knowing the true structure of the model and observing all economic variables and shocks perfectly 
in real-time.  What matters of course for economists is not whether the assumption is literally true, since it 
clearly is not, but rather whether the deviations from FIRE are significant enough to have important 
economic implications.  The statistical rejection of the null of FIRE arising from the predictability of 
forecast errors by certain macroeconomic variables over different time periods does not directly shed light 
as to whether these rejections are economically significant. 
Our approach can address most of these concerns.  First, because we derive predictions from 
models of informational rigidities that nest the full-information assumption, we have guidance from the 
theory as to what the relevant RHS variable should be, namely the revision in forecasts for the relevant 
time horizon.  Thus, the incentive for data-mining is reduced since the relevant RHS variable is motivated 
by theoretical considerations.  Second, there is a well-defined alternative hypothesis from models of 
informational rigidities given by the prediction that   0 , as well as additional testable restrictions, 
which allow us to ascertain whether rejections of the null of FIRE indicate rejections of rationality or of 
the full-information assumption.  Third, because both theoretical models of informational rigidities imply 
that the coefficient on forecast revisions maps directly into the underlying parameters governing the 
degree of information rigidity, our approach can recover direct estimates of informational frictions and, 
hence, can help assess the economic significance of any rejections of the null hypothesis of FIRE. 
3.2  Evidence from U.S. Inflation Forecasts of Professional Forecasters 
As a first step to applying our approach, we again follow most of literature on survey measures of 
expectations and focus on historical inflation forecasts by U.S. professional forecasters.  Both sticky-
information and imperfect information models predict a relationship between the mean ex post inflation 
forecast errors and the mean inflation forecast revisions such that 
                                              (12) 
where   0  if informational rigidities are present.  From 1969-2010, we find       1.23  0.50  as shown 
in Panel B of Table 1.  As a result, we can reject the null of FIRE at the 5% level of statistical significance 
in a manner that is directly informative about the expectations formation process.  First, the rejection of 
the null goes exactly in the direction predicted by models of informational rigidities, so that this finding 
presents direct evidence in favor of these models.  Second, because   maps into the degree of information 
rigidity from each model, we can extract an estimate of informational frictions: e.g.         / 1        
0.55.  In the context of sticky-information models, this estimate of   would imply that agents update their 
information sets every six to seven months on average.  Alternatively, one can interpret this estimate of   
under imperfect information models as implying that agents put a weight of less than one-half on new 11 
 
information and more than one-half on their previous forecasts.  Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2008) find 
similar, albeit slightly higher, estimates of information rigidity using the conditional response of forecast 
errors to economic shocks.  As documented in theoretical work (e.g., Reis 2009), this magnitude of 
informational frictions should have important quantitative implications for macroeconomic dynamics.  
Thus, our approach implies that informational frictions are economically as well as statistically 
significant.
8   
We can also test a restriction implied by these models, namely that the coefficients on the 
contemporaneous forecast and on the lagged forecast are equal in absolute value.  To implement this 
additional test, we decompose the forecast revision into two terms as follows 
                                            .   (13) 
Under models of informational rigidities, we expect     0 ,      0 , and          0 .  Estimating 
equation (13) from 1969-2010, we find        1.24  0.51  and         1.27  0.51 .  The signs on both 
coefficients conform to the theoretical predictions of models of informational rigidities, and we cannot 
reject the null that the sum of the two coefficients is equal to zero.  The results therefore provide 
additional evidence consistent with the notion that the expectations formation process of professional 
forecasters is subject to information constraints. 
Panel B of Table 1 revisits the predictive power of other lagged variables for ex post mean 
forecast errors when one accounts for the forecast revisions.  The two models of informational rigidities 
imply that once forecast revisions are included on the RHS of (12), other variables in forecasters’ 
information sets should have no additional predictive power, i.e. forecast revisions are a sufficient statistic 
for characterizing the predictability of ex post forecast errors.  Columns (2)-(5) assess this prediction 
using the same four variables previously found to have predictive power for ex post forecast errors.  For 
three of the variables, inflation, interest rates and changes in real oil prices, the coefficients are not 
statistically significant which is consistent with the predictions of models of informational rigidities.  The 
result is, on the other hand, at odds with adaptive expectations: if agents were forming their forecasts of 
inflation using only past values of inflation, then forecast errors should be predictable using other 
macroeconomic determinants of inflation.  Strikingly, this result obtains despite the fact that we picked 
these variables specifically because previous work has identified them as variables for which the null of 
FIRE is rejected.  Of course, one should again be wary of placing too much weight on this kind of test.  
As with tests of FIRE, trying enough RHS variables is bound to lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis.  
                                                      
8 This finding implies that the mean forecast across professional forecasters can be adjusted by the forecast revision 
to systematically reduce forecast errors.  Crowe (2010) shows that the MSE of consensus forecasts could have been 
reduced by approximately 5% between 2007 and 2009 by applying this adjustment.  However, because forecasters 
in the SPF do not observe the mean forecast when making their own forecasts, this feature of the data cannot be 
exploited by forecasters in real-time. 12 
 
Indeed, we find one such rejection of the null under models of informational rigidities when controlling 
for lagged unemployment: high unemployment is systematically associated with negative ex post 
inflation forecast errors even after controlling for the forecast revisions.  One interpretation, as with 
traditional tests of FIRE, is that this finding indicates a direct rejection of models of information rigidities.  
Another view suggests that this finding could be a statistical anomaly.  A third interpretation comes from 
the fact that regressing ex post forecast errors on unemployment comes close to estimating an 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve.  For example, a New Keynesian-type Phillips curve would relate 
the difference between current inflation and the current mean forecast of future inflation (           ) to 
a measure of real economic conditions such as the unemployment rate or the output gap.  Because our ex 
post forecast errors are highly correlated with the gap between current inflation and the forecast of future 
inflation (correlation of 0.66), this Phillips curve relationship could account for the apparent predictive 
power of unemployment for ex post forecast errors observed in Table 1 in small samples.   
3.3  Information Rigidities, Model Heterogeneity or Forecast Smoothing? 
The sticky information and imperfect information models both point to a systematic relationship between 
ex post mean forecast errors and ex ante mean forecast revisions which, at least for professional 
forecasters, is consistent with historical survey data of inflation expectations.  However, differences in the 
information sets of economic agents need not be the only possible explanation for these patterns.  One 
alternative is heterogeneity in the models used by these agents to process common information and 
generate forecasts.  This alternative includes models with learning, in which agents have different priors 
about the parameters of the underlying data-generating process (DGP), and models in which agents have 
different beliefs about the DGP.  However, these models are at odds with two stylized facts about 
professional forecasts.  First, model heterogeneity implies that some forecasters should systematically 
outperform the mean forecast because these agents employ models that are closer to the true DGP than 
models of other agents.  Yet one of the most robust empirical findings from the empirical forecasting 
literature contradicts this prediction: mean forecasts consistently outperform the forecasts of any 
individual forecaster (e.g. Bauer et al., 2003).  Second, one could imagine a setting in which no model 
used by forecasters is systematically better than others, but some forecasters have models which better 
characterize the response of the economy to certain shocks than others, e.g. forecaster A has a good model 
for oil price shocks while forecaster B has a better model for nominal shocks.  In such a setting, the top 
forecaster after an oil price shock would likely be the agent with the better model of oil price shocks.  
Given the persistent effects of economic shocks, the top forecaster from one period should then be more 
likely to have a top forecast in subsequent periods than other forecasters.  However, this prediction is also 
at odds with the empirical evidence: Brian and Molloy (2007) document that top forecasters in one period 13 
 
are no more likely to be top forecasters in the next period than others.  This mean reversion in the quality 
of forecasts cannot readily be reconciled with model heterogeneity being the primary source of 
differences in short-run forecasts across professionals.
9   
A second possibility is that the observed deviations from FIRE reflect objective functions on the 
part of forecasters that depart from minimizing mean-squared errors.  This notion seems particularly 
probable under the sticky-information interpretation of the results: taken literally, the sticky-information 
model implies that professional forecasters do not update their forecasts, or incorporate any new 
information, for extended periods of time.  This literal interpretation would seem to be implausible.
10  On 
the other hand, one could take a broader view of the model relying on the fact that what professional 
forecasters do is not just estimate an econometric model every month or quarter and distribute the results; 
a key service they supply to their clients is a comprehensive overview and interpretation of current 
macroeconomic developments and possible future outcomes.  One could then interpret sticky-information 
not as the actual rate of information updating but more broadly as the rate at which professional 
forecasters revise their interpretation of the data. 
One could argue that this broader view, while more palatable, is no longer an argument about 
informational rigidities per se but rather about reputational considerations leading to forecast smoothing 
by professional forecasters (as in Laster el. (1995)) who would want to provide their clientele with 
“stories” consistent over time.  To see how these reputational considerations could be misinterpreted as 
informational rigidities, consider a stylized optimization problem for a forecaster i who knows the current 
full-information rational expectations forecast of a variable x at time t+j (      ).  The forecaster must 
choose a current forecast (  
     ) to minimize the MSE of forecasts subject to a penalty that is increasing 
in the difference between the current forecast and that of the previous period 
min  
                    
      
 
       
            
       
 
 . 
This simple setup highlights the conflicting objectives of professional forecasters: providing good 
forecasts (the first component) while maintaining a consistent story over time (the second term,   0 ).  
The first order condition with respect to the contemporaneous forecast yields the following relationship 
between ex post forecast errors and the ex ante forecast revision of the professional forecaster: 
                                                      
9 For longer-horizon forecasts, model-heterogeneity is likely to be more important than individual information sets.  
For example, long-run unemployment rate forecasts should depend primarily on whether forecasters accord any 
weight to hysteresis.  Similarly, current 2-3 year-ahead inflation forecasts for the U.S. should hinge on whether 
forecasters use a Keynesian-type model, in which the current large output gaps should point to low inflationary 
pressures, or a monetarist-type model, in which the expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet is likely to presage 
increased inflationary pressures in the future.  Because our focus is on forecasts at relatively short-horizons (up to 
one year ahead), these considerations are likely to be dominated by informational factors, as documented in the text.  
10 Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) use individual forecasts of professional forecasters in Europe to quantify how 
frequently forecasters do not change their forecasts at all and find a frequency of updating forecasts of 
approximately 0.75 per quarter,  of which only a fraction is likely to be due to rounding errors.  14 
 
         
         ∆    
            ,  
where      ,  is the rational expectations error as defined in (4) and ∆  
          
            
      .  
Averaged across forecasters, this expression yields an identical relationship between mean forecast errors 
and forecast revisions as that implied by both sticky information and imperfect information models, but 
the coefficient on forecast revisions would now be interpreted as the marginal cost of changing the 
forecasts due to reputational considerations on the part of professional forecasters.  Hence, the results in 
Table 1 could be interpreted as stemming from informational rigidities or from reputational concerns by 
professional forecasters.   
  To disentangle these different interpretations of the data, we consider several additional tests of 
inflation expectations.  As a first step, we study forecasts from different types of professional forecasters.  
The Livingston Survey of Professional Forecasters, a biannual survey first established in 1946 by the 
columnist Joseph Livingston and maintained since 1990 by the Philadelphia Fed, provides individual 
inflation forecasts from economists at academic institutions, commercial banks, and non-financial firms, 
among others.
11  For each forecaster, the survey includes their forecasts of the CPI in 6 months and in 12 
months.
12  Thus, we can apply our empirical specification at the 6-month forecasting horizon.  Table 2 
presents the results from 1969 to 2010 for the mean forecasts across all professional forecasters as well as 
using the mean forecasts across subsets of professional forecasters.  Using all forecasters in the 
Livingston survey, the coefficient on forecast revisions is slightly above one as found using the SPF.  
There are substantial differences across forecaster types however: academic economists have the smallest 
estimated coefficient while commercial banks have a significantly higher coefficient estimate than 
academics.  This result is at odds with what one would expect to find if the results were driven by 
reputational considerations: the forecasts of academics are entirely for external distribution, hence one 
would expect the reputational considerations to be particularly important for these agents, while forecasts 
from industry are primarily for internal profit-generating activities such that one would expect 
reputational factors to be subordinate to minimizing forecasting errors.  Because the data point to greater 
rigidity of forecasts on the part of private industry forecasters than academics, we interpret this finding as 
more suggestive of informational rigidities than reputational considerations.
13 
  As a second step, we consider two additional sources of expectations for which maintaining 
credibility should play little to no role in determining forecasts: consumer expectations and expectations 
                                                      
11 The categories of forecasters also include investment banks, government forecasters, the Federal Reserve, labor 
organizations, and “other.”  We do not look at these in detail because of how few forecasters there are in each of 
these groups over time.  The data is available on the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
12 Forecasts are of the seasonally-unadjusted CPI prior to December 2004 and seasonally adjusted thereafter. 
13 Private sector forecasts could still be subject to reputational considerations within the firm (i.e. if forecasters need 
to defend their forecasts to other individuals in the firm) but these considerations should probably be less important 
than reputational considerations pertinent to forecasts aimed at the general public. 15 
 
derived from asset prices.  For the former, we rely on the Michigan Survey of Consumers.  Each month, 
the University of Michigan surveys 500-1,500 households and asks them about their expectation of price 
changes over the course of the next year.  For the latter, we use the inflation expectations data from the 
Cleveland Fed based on the method developed in Haubrich, Pennacchi and Ritchken (2008) who rely on 
the term structure of interest rates and inflation swaps to extract measures of market expectations of CPI 
inflation at multiple yearly horizons starting in 1982.  Both market-based and consumer expectations of 
inflation should be independent of reputational considerations (anonymous forecasts for consumers; 
money on the table for asset prices) and therefore should help distinguish between informational rigidities 
and forecast smoothing arising from concerns about maintaining credibility.  Figure 1 plots these two sets 
of inflation forecasts, as well as the corresponding year-ahead CPI inflation forecasts from the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters.  All three series are highly correlated, but the financial market and professional 
forecasts exhibit particularly strong comovement.   
  Table 3 presents the root mean squared forecast errors from 1982 to 2009 for all three forecasts.  
The Survey of Professional Forecasters has the smallest MSE, although the difference with respect to 
market-based forecasts is not statistically significant.  Nonetheless, if professional forecasts were smooth 
because of reputational considerations, one would expect these forecasts to be worse on average than 
market-driven expectations.  Ang et al. (2007) similarly find that professional forecasts outperform a 
variety of model-based forecasts, asset-pricing implied forecasts and consumer forecasts.  Table 3 also 
presents results of regressions designed to assess the information content of each type of forecast.   
Specifically, we regress ex post CPI inflation on the ex ante forecasts.  When both professional forecasts 
and consumer forecasts are included, the coefficient on professional forecasts is large, statistically 
significantly different from zero but not from one, while that on consumer forecasts is small and not 
statistically different from zero.  Hence, there appears to be little additional informational content in 
consumer forecasts relative to professional forecasts.  When this exercise is repeated with market-based 
expectations of inflation in place of consumer forecasts, the results are even more pronounced.  Again, 
this result is inconsistent with reputational considerations accounting for smooth forecasts on the part of 
professional forecasters since one would then expect market-based and possibly consumer forecasts to 
have significantly more explanatory power than professional forecasts.   
  We can also estimate the coefficient on forecast revisions for each type of forecast to assess 
whether this coefficient is significantly lower for consumers and market-based forecasts, as would be 
expected if reputational concerns account for smoothing on the part of professional forecasters.  However, 
because the Michigan Survey of Consumers as well as the market-based expectations are only available at 
a forecasting horizon of one year, we replace the forecast revision with the change in the year-ahead 
forecast, yielding the following specification 16 
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where     ,  denotes the inflation rate between t+4 and t.  In this case, the error term will consist of the 
rational expectations forecast error, as in equation (12), and                        because the 
forecasts do not have perfectly overlapping time horizons across periods.  As a result, this specification 
cannot be estimated by OLS.  Instead, we estimate this specification by GMM, using as instruments 
innovations to oil prices at time t.
14  These innovations are valid instruments because they are 
uncorrelated with both past information (t-1 and earlier) as well as the rational expectations error.   
Furthermore, because oil prices have significant effects on CPI inflation, these should be instrumental 
variables with the desired properties.  As illustrated in Table 4, these oil price innovations are statistically 
significant predictors of contemporaneous changes in inflation forecasts for all three measures of inflation 
expectations and can account for an important share of their volatility.  Applying this estimation approach 
to a common time sample of 1982 to 2009, we find a coefficient on forecast revisions of 1.3 for 
professional forecasters, a finding that closely mirrors our previous results.  For consumers, the point 
estimate is smaller but also highly statistically significant which conforms to the findings of Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2008).  For market expectations, the point estimate is even higher than for professional 
forecasters, but it is also less precisely estimated which is likely a result of the reduced predictive power 
of oil price innovations on market-based forecast revisions.  As with the previous tests, the evidence 
continues to point primarily toward informational rigidities as the likely source of the positive coefficient 
on forecast revisions rather than reputational considerations since we find qualitatively similar results for 
consumers and market-based forecasts as with professional forecaster data.
15 
3.4  Pooled U.S. Evidence on Informational Rigidities among Professional Forecasters 
While much of the empirical literature on the expectations formation process has focused on inflation 
forecasts, our approach is readily applicable to different macroeconomic variables.  Furthermore, we can 
                                                      
14 Specifically, we run an AR(2) on the first difference of the log of nominal oil prices and define the residuals as oil 
price innovations. 
15 There are two other pieces of evidence favoring an information rigidity interpretation of the coefficient on forecast 
revisions.  First, as presented in section 4.1, the cross-sectional heterogeneity in coefficients on forecast revisions 
across countries and macroeconomic variables can be well-accounted for using the predicted determinants of 
imperfect information models.  Second, the observational equivalence of the relationship between ex post mean 
forecast errors and ex ante mean forecast revisions in models of informational rigidities versus forecast smoothing 
motives obtains only when the forecast smoothing is modeled in a static fashion.  In general, if forecasters wish to 
minimize changes in their forecasts, then they will also take into account the fact that the current choice of their 
forecast will affect the cost of changing forecasts next period.  If one includes this dynamic element, ex post forecast 
errors should depend positively on the current forecast revision but also negatively on the expected forecast revision 
in the next period, i.e.                                                                 .  This specification 
can be estimated by GMM after substituting ex post values for ex ante expectations under the null of full-
information rational expectations.  Empirical estimates of this augmented specification using SPF forecasts 
consistently yield positive estimates on future forecast revisions, with varying degrees of statistical significance, 
which is inconsistent with the sign restrictions imposed by the dynamic forecast smoothing model. 17 
 
also exploit the multiple forecasting horizons available in the data to further expand the power of our 
tests.  In this section, we apply our method to professional forecasts for a multitude of macroeconomic 
variables and forecasting horizons.   
As a first step, we exploit the fact that the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) contains 
quarterly forecasts for four additional macroeconomic variables going back to 1968Q4: besides the GDP 
price deflator, these include real output, industrial production, housing starts, and the unemployment 
rate.
16  Furthermore, each of these variables is available at multiple forecasting horizons, ranging from 
forecasts of the current quarter to 4 quarters ahead.  To exploit this additional dimension, we utilize each 
of the individual quarterly forecasting horizons in our estimation.  Thus, we estimate a pooled regression  
  ,          ,                ,        , ,    (14) 
where  xi indicates which macroeconomic variable is included and h denotes the specific forecasting 
horizon ranging from 0 (forecasts of the current quarter) to 3 (forecasts for 3 quarters ahead).  We 
consider direct estimates of equation (14) as well as estimates augmented to include cross-sectional and 
time fixed effects.  While the SPF includes forecasts up to 4 quarters ahead, the horizon is limited to 3 
quarters in the empirical specification because forecast revisions call for an additional forecasting 
horizon, e.g. when h=3, the forecast revision is     ,            ,   .  To construct forecast errors, we use 
real-time values available one year after the relevant time horizon.  For the first three series, forecasts of 
annualized quarterly percent changes are constructed from the underlying mean forecasts of the levels.  
Table 5 presents the results of this pooled regression over 3,240 observations as well as when we include 
cross-sectional fixed effects (for both the forecasting horizon and macroeconomic variable) and both 
cross-sectional and time fixed effects.
17  In each case, the estimate of β is positive and statistically 
significant so that we can reject the null of FIRE in exactly the direction predicted by models of 
informational rigidities.  The point estimates of β imply that the average duration between information 
updates is four months (in the context of sticky-information models) or that new information moves 
forecasts by 70% of what it would be under full-information (in the context of imperfect information 
models).  The standard errors are now smaller than when the degree of information rigidity was based 
only on forecasts of one-year ahead inflation rates, which reflects the increased precision arising from 
                                                      
16 Output is measured by GNP prior to 1992 and GDP thereafter.  The price deflator is the implicit GNP deflator 
before 1992, implicit GDP deflator from 1992 to 1996, and the chained GDP deflator thereafter.  The SPF also 
includes historical forecasts of corporate profits.  However, the quality of this data is much worse than for other 
variables, reflecting sensitivity to factors like TVA adjustments.  Private communications with Tom Stark, the 
manager of the SPF dataset, confirmed that individuals often report forecasts of corporate profits using definitions at 
odds with the SPF definition, so that mean forecasts are excessively volatile as a result of measurement issues.   
17 For each pooled dataset, we identify and remove outliers using jackknife and Cook’s distance.  Removing outliers 
makes estimates more stable and precise. The qualitative results do not change when outliers are not removed. 18 
 
pooling across multiple macroeconomic variables and forecasting horizons.
18  Furthermore, when we 
decompose the forecast revision into two components, the contemporaneous forecast and the lagged 
forecast, as in equation (13), each coefficient is of the sign predicted by theoretical models of 
informational rigidities and we cannot reject the null hypothesis from these models that the sum of the 
two coefficients is equal to zero at the five percent level of statistical significance. 
Starting in 1981, the SPF includes forecasts of 8 additional macroeconomic variables: the 3-
month Treasury bill (Tbill) rate, the AAA interest rate, real consumption expenditures, real residential 
investment, real non-residential investment, real federal government expenditures, real state/local 
government expenditures, and the overall CPI.  For each NIPA series and CPI inflation, we construct 
forecasts of annualized quarterly percent changes and use real-time data to construct forecast errors, while 
the two interest rates are measured in levels.  The forecast horizons again run from h=0 to h=3.  Thus, 
pooling across all of the variables available in the SPF since 1981 and all forecasting horizons yields 
5,793 observations.  The results from estimating equation (14), presented in Table 5, again point to an 
estimate of β which is positive and statistically different from zero, whether or not fixed effects are 
included.  The point estimate is larger than in the previous case, pointing to average durations between 
information updates of approximately five months in the context of sticky information models, or a 
weight of 60% being assigned to new information in the formation of forecasts in the context of imperfect 
information models.  Furthermore, a decomposition of the forecast revision into current versus lagged 
forecasts again yields the result predicted by models of informational rigidities that we cannot reject the 
sum of the two coefficients being equal to zero nor can we reject the sign restrictions implied by these 
models. 
3.5  Cross-Country Evidence on Informational Rigidities among Professional Forecasters 
In addition to the U.S. Survey of Professional Forecasters, we have constructed a dataset of quarterly 
forecasts from the international survey of professional forecasters done by Consensus Economics.  This 
dataset covers twelve countries: the G-7 countries of U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Italy, Japan and 
Canada as well as Spain, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.
19  Data for the G-7 countries 
spans 1989 to 2010 while data for other countries begin primarily in 1994.
20  For each country, forecasts 
for five macroeconomic variables are available: consumer price inflation, real GDP growth, interest rates, 
                                                      
18 Because the errors are likely to be correlated over time as well as across macroeconomic variables and forecasting 
horizons, we use Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors which are robust to both time and cross-sectional correlation 
of the error terms. 
19 Consensus Economics provides forecasts for many more countries than the twelve included in our sample, often at 
the monthly frequency, but these forecasts are restricted to the calendar year time horizon.  While our method is 
well-suited to these fixed forecasting horizons, we focus on this restricted set of countries because of the larger set 
of forecasting horizons available. 
20 Forecasts for Norway and Switzerland only become available in 1998. 19 
 
industrial production growth and real consumption growth.  Forecasts are available for the current quarter 
and for the subsequent 5-6 quarters.  As a first step, we estimate the average degree of information 
rigidity pooled across all macroeconomic variables, countries and forecast horizons, i.e.  
  , ,          , ,                , ,        , , ,    (15) 
where i denotes the macroeconomic variable, j the country and h the forecasting horizon.  Based on 
22,347 observations, the results again point to an estimate of β, presented in Table 5, that is positive and 
statistically significant, confirming our finding from U.S. professional forecasters.  This occurs when 
equation (15) is estimated by OLS or including cross-sectional fixed effects for different countries, 
variables, and forecasting horizons, as well as with both cross-sectional and time fixed effects.  The 
implied degree of information rigidity is very close to the estimates for the U.S. using the wider set of 
variables from 1982 to 2010.  When we decompose the forecast revision (Panel B), each coefficient has 
the same sign as predicted by models of informational rigidities and we again cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the sum of the two coefficients is equal to zero at the five percent level of statistical 
significance.   
In addition, we consider country-specific estimates of the degree of information rigidity, pooled 
over macroeconomic variables and forecasting horizons.  Figure 2 plots the resulting estimates of β for 
each country.  The countries with the highest degrees of informational rigidities are Spain and Sweden, 
while the lowest are Canada and Norway.  All of the estimates are statistically significantly positive so we 
can reject the null of FIRE for every country and this rejection of the null goes exactly in the direction 
predicted by models of informational rigidities.  The substantial cross-country heterogeneity in 
information rigidity, ranging from estimates of 0.3 for Canada to almost one for Spain, point to a potential 
role for policy and institutions in determining country levels of information rigidity, an issue to which we 
return in section 4.2. 
IV  Determinants of Informational Rigidities 
The empirical results pooled across macroeconomic variables and forecasting horizons are strongly 
supportive of models with informational frictions: the estimated coefficients on forecast revisions are 
consistently positive as predicted by these theories and large enough to affect macroeconomic dynamics.  
Given these findings, we turn to the question of differentiating between sticky information and imperfect 
information models of the expectations formation process, as well as evaluating the underlying 
macroeconomic and policy determinants of informational rigidities.   
4.1  Differentiating by Forecast Horizon and Forecasted Variable 
In the sticky-information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Reis (2006), firms update their 
information sets infrequently, but when they do so, they acquire full-information rational expectations.  20 
 
As a result, there is a single parameter governing the frequency of updating information which is common 
across macroeconomic variables and forecasting horizons.  Thus, a testable implication of the sticky-
information model is that the estimated degree of information rigidity is invariant to the forecasting 
horizon and the variable being forecasted.  In imperfect information models, on the other hand, the 
coefficient on forecast revisions for a given macroeconomic variable will be governed by the Kalman 
gain associated with that variable, which will depend on factors such as the persistence of the series and 
the strength of the signal observed with respect to that macroeconomic variable.  The signal-noise ratio 
could vary across variables for a variety of reasons, such as the magnitude of data revisions and the 
frequency of data releases.  Both factors would affect the strength of the signal observed for a 
macroeconomic variable when forecasts are done at the quarterly frequency.  One way to assess the 
relative merits of these two models in accounting for the expectations formation process of professional 
forecasters is therefore to compare the estimated degrees of information rigidity across macroeconomic 
variables being forecasted as well as across forecasting horizons. 
  We provide two decompositions of our pooled estimates from each dataset: one by forecasting 
horizon (left column of Figure 3) and one by macroeconomic variable (right column of Figure 3).  For the 
U.S. SPF, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients across forecasting horizons, as 
predicted by both models of informational rigidities for quarterly forecasts (p-values of 0.15 and 0.23 for 
1968 variables and 1981 variables respectively), but we can strongly reject (p-value < 0.001) the null of 
equality across macroeconomic variables for the thirteen variables available since 1981 and weakly so for 
the five variables available since 1968 (p-value = 0.06).  With the cross-country Consensus Economics 
data, we can again strongly reject the null of equality across macroeconomic variables (p-value < 0.001) 
and, unlike with the U.S. SPF data, we can also strongly reject the null of equality across forecast 
horizons (p-value < 0.001).   
One clear result is that the degree of information rigidity is not equal across macroeconomic 
variables: an implication at odds with sticky-information models.  On the other hand, the fact that 
heterogeneity in information rigidity exists across macroeconomic variables does not imply that imperfect 
information models can account for this cross-sectional variation. In the simple imperfect information 
model of section 2.2, the degree of information rigidity depends on the Kalman gain, which is a function 
of the persistence of the underlying macroeconomic process as well as the precision of the signal received 
by economic agents.  More persistent processes imply, holding all else constant, that agents should pay 
more attention to current signals since forecast errors for a persistent process convey more information 
about the future than when the underlying process is less persistent.  A more precise signal naturally 
implies that agents should place relatively more weight on the current signal than on past forecasts.  Thus, 21 
 
imperfect information models imply that the degree of information rigidity should be decreasing in the 
persistence of the series being forecasted and increasing in the amount of noise in the signal.   
To assess these predictions, we construct measures of each as follows.  First, for each country j 
and macroeconomic variable i in the Consensus Economics survey of professional forecasters, we fit an 
autoregressive process which yields an estimate of both the persistence of the variable (ρi,j) and the 
volatility of its innovations (σi,j).  Second, we generate a measure of the noise associated with each series 
from a) the standard deviation of revisions to this series or b) the standard deviation of forecast 
disagreement for this series.
21  Third, we construct a measure of the noise-signal ratio (κi,j) by taking the 
ratio of a measure of the noise to the standard deviation of the innovations to the variable from the first 
step.  Given these measures of the predicted determinants of information rigidity, we assess their 
importance by regressing our estimates of the coefficients on forecast revisions for each country-
macroeconomic variable pair, pooled across forecasting horizons, in the cross-country Consensus 
Economics dataset set  
  ,          ,        ,          ,    (16) 
where i denotes a specific variable, j denotes the country, and βi,j is the estimated coefficient on forecast 
revisions for each country-variable pair in the cross-country data-set.
22   
The results are presented in Table 6.  The coefficients on the persistence are consistently negative 
across specifications.  When using the noise-signal ratio measured using data-revisions (i.e. exploiting 
only common sources of noise), the coefficient is positive, as expected, but not significantly different 
from zero.  Appendix Figure 1 shows that this is sensitive to outliers.  As a result, we also consider 
estimates of (16) based on robust S-regressions, which automatically identify and account for outliers, and 
the results point to a positive and statistically significant effect of the noise-signal ratio, as predicted by 
the imperfect information model.  Simply dropping the outliers identified by the S-regression leads to 
similar results.  When we use the cross-sectional dispersion of forecasts, which includes both common 
and idiosyncratic information among forecasters, to measure noise, the coefficient on the noise-signal 
ratio of each country-variable pair is positive and statistically significant whether or not we control for 
outliers.  Strikingly, this simple specification can account for about 20-30 percent of the heterogeneity in 
informational rigidities.  Thus, not only are the theoretical predictions of imperfect information models 
                                                      
21 Specifically, for each time period, we take the difference between measures of the variable available two quarters 
and four quarters later, then compute the standard deviation of these revisions across the entire sample.  Alternative 
time horizons for measuring revisions yield the same qualitative results.  Real-time data, including revisions over the 
course of a year, are included in the Consensus Economics dataset.  Data on cross-section dispersion of forecasts 
(forecast disagreement) are available for the growth rate of GDP, consumption and industrial production as well as 
inflation.  
22 Because the cross-section of forecasted macroeconomic variables in the U.S. Survey of Professional Forecasters is 
relatively small (13 variables consistently available since 1981), we only apply this analysis to the cross-country 
data. 22 
 
qualitatively consistent with the observed heterogeneity in informational rigidities across countries and 
variables, but this model can also quantitatively account for a considerable share of the observed cross-
sectional variation.   
  The fact that we can reject the null of equality across forecast horizons using the Consensus 
Economics data but not for the U.S. SPF is also useful to differentiate between the models.  As presented 
in Section 2, both models predict that the estimated coefficient on forecast revisions should be identical 
for different forecasting horizons when forecasts are for quarterly changes.  However, the forecasts of 
GDP, consumption and industrial production growth in the Consensus Economics survey are for year-on-
year percent changes, and the inflation rate is measured by year-on-year percent changes in the price 
level.  This distinction makes no difference under sticky-information, and the prediction remains that the 
coefficient on forecast revisions be equal across forecasting horizons, contrary to what we observe in the 
data.  For imperfect information models, on the other hand, this distinction is important.  Consider, for 
example, the forecast for the current quarter year-on-year GDP growth: the forecasters have observed 
values for at least two, and likely three, of the four quarters over which they are forecasting.  Hence, they 
have already received very strong signals about the value of current year-on-year GDP growth.  When, on 
the other hand, they must forecast year-on-year GDP growth in four quarters, they will not have observed 
any of the quarterly values over which the forecast is made and therefore the available signals will be 
much weaker.  Thus, the strength of the signal is falling over the first four forecasting horizons (h = 0 to 
3) so that one would expect the estimated coefficient on forecast revisions to be rising over these 
horizons, which is exactly the pattern observed in Figure 3.
23 We have verified in Monte Carlo 
simulations of the imperfect information model in section 2.2 that this feature of the Consensus 
Economics surveys can indeed account for the rising estimated coefficients across forecasting horizons.  
Further evidence that the large increase in estimated coefficients with the forecasting horizon is driven by 
this feature of the Consensus Economics forecasts is that, if we estimate the coefficient on forecast 
revisions at different horizons specifically for interest rate forecasts, which are not measured in year-on-
year changes, the rising pattern of estimated coefficients is substantially dampened.  
                                                      
23 The drop in the estimated coefficients at longer forecasting horizons in Figure 2, which occurs in both the SPF and 
Consensus data, appears to be driven entirely by finite sample issues combined with some variables not being very 
persistent.  This is because, with low persistence, forecasts of distant values will be near constant, so that 
contemporaneous forecast revisions will have very little explanatory power for ex post forecast errors, pushing the 
estimated coefficient toward zero in small samples.  This is true under both sticky-information and imperfect 
information models and is thus not informative about the relative merit of the two approaches.  We have verified in 
Monte Carlo simulations that this persistence issue can reproduce the observed decline in estimated coefficients in 
Figure 2.  Furthermore, when we reproduce the decomposition across forecasting horizons for variables measured in 
changes (GDP growth, consumption growth, etc) which are not very persistent versus those variables measured in 
levels which are much more persistent on average, we find that the decline in estimated coefficients at longer 
forecasting horizons is non-existent for the latter but particularly pronounced for the former.  Results are available 
upon request. 23 
 
4.2  Policy and Institutional Determinants of Information Rigidity 
The previous section presents evidence that the varying degrees of information rigidity associated with 
macroeconomic variables are well-explained by the persistence and noise-signal ratios of these variables.  
However these determinants are themselves functions of policy and institutional characteristics.  In this 
section, we consider the possible effect of three sets of monetary policy institutions and actions on the 
degree of information rigidity.  First, we assess whether informational rigidities in the U.S. changed with 
the onset of the Great Moderation, the dramatic decline in macroeconomic volatility commonly associated 
with the monetary policy changes enacted under Fed Chairman Paul Volcker.  Second, we assess to what 
extent the independence of the central bank affects the expectations formation process across countries.  
Third, we consider whether the official adoption of inflation targeting by central banks affects the degree 
of information rigidity in inflation forecasts. 
4.2.1.   Great Moderation 
McConnell and Perez-Quirós (2000) and others have documented a substantial decrease in 
macroeconomic volatility both in the U.S. and other developed countries since the early to mid-1980s.  
Figure 4 plots the time-varying standard deviation of real GDP growth for the U.S., for example, which is 
rising throughout the 1970s, peaks in the very early 1980s, then exhibits a very sharp decline in the mid-
1980s, declining by more than half relative to the average level during the 1970s.  While the source of this 
phenomenon remains a point of contention, one prominent explanation emphasizes the changes in 
monetary policy put in place under Volcker, either in terms of a stronger endogenous response to 
macroeconomic fluctuations as in Clarida et al. (2000) or because of the Volcker disinflation as in 
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2009).  At the same time, there is only mixed evidence that microeconomic 
volatility declined over this time period.  For example, Davis et al. (2006) report that the volatility of 
employment has fallen since the 1970s for non-publicly traded firms while Comin and Mulani (2004) and 
Comin and Philippon (2005) show that volatility increased for publicly traded firms over the same period. 
Furthermore, volatility at the household level appears to have been trending up over time (see Davis and 
Kahn (2008) for a review). As a result of the reduction in the volatility of macroeconomic variables 
relative to microeconomic variables, one might expect that economic agents would choose to allocate 
relatively more resources to tracking micro rather than macro-level shocks since these shocks become 
quantitatively more important for profits and utility.  Thus information rigidity should have increased 
with the arrival of the Great Moderation.  
To explore this hypothesis, we estimate equation (10) for each quarter separately using SPF data 
and then compute non-parametrically a local average of the estimated  ’s for each period to provide a 
sense of the low frequency variation in the degree of informational rigidities.  Figure 4 plots the dynamics 24 
 
of the local averages of   as well as associated standard errors. The figure shows that informational 
rigidities were falling from the late 1960s to the early 1980s as the volatility of macroeconomic variables 
was rising.
24  The minimum level of information rigidity is reached in 1983-84, which closely matches the 
start of the Great Moderation identified in McConnell and Perez-Quirós (2000), and since then, the 
estimated degree of information rigidity has consistently been increasing. The changes in the level of 
informational rigidities over time are statistically and economically significant, especially when one 
compares mid-1980s and in late 2000s.  
This significant low-frequency variation in the estimated coefficients on forecast revisions 
suggests that one should be wary of treating informational rigidities at the macroeconomic level as a 
structural parameter since these rigidities can vary over time in response to changes in macroeconomic 
conditions.  Specifically, more tranquil times should be ceteris paribus associated with greater 
informational rigidities.  However, the rising degree of inattention over the course of the 1990s and 2000s 
implies that the same sized shock would have larger real effects towards the end of the sample because 
informational rigidities, like nominal rigidities, amplify the response of the economy to a given set of 
shocks.  Thus, this observation suggests an additional mechanism, along with increased risk-taking on the 
part of financial market participants, through which the Great Moderation may have contributed to the 
severity of the Great Recession.
25 
4.2.2  Central Bank Independence 
The evolution of U.S. monetary policy under Volcker can be characterized as a change in the policy rule 
decided upon internally by members of the FOMC.  To the extent that that this reform contributed to the 
Great Moderation, it appears to have had large effects on the degree of information rigidity faced by 
economic agents.  But people’s incentive to allocate resources to keeping track of macroeconomic 
conditions also depends on the institutional characteristics of the central bank.  For example, in the 
seminal Barro and Gordon (1983) exposition of the time inconsistency problem, the inflation bias 
associated with discretionary monetary policy hinges upon the central bank’s target unemployment rate 
being less than the natural rate of unemployment.  This policy objective is more likely to occur when 
central banks are subject to the influence of elected officials whose job security hinges disproportionately 
on the state of the real economy.  As a result, minimizing this influence by making central banks more 
                                                      
24 Although we do not have SPF forecast data before 1968, we conjecture that the relatively high informational 
rigidities in the late 1960s can be explained by the relatively tranquil period experienced by the U.S. economy 
during the 1960s. 
25 The figure also suggests that the high volatility of the 1970s led to a gradual increase in attention on the part of 
economic agents, making the economy become progressively less sensitive to any given shock.  This decline in 
information rigidity may therefore also have contributed to onset of the Great Moderation.  More generally, the 
figure points to the possibility of low-frequency cycles in volatility arising from the endogenous response of 
information rigidities to volatility and the feedback effect of changing information rigidity on volatility. 25 
 
independent of elected officials has been one of the defining institutional reforms of central banks 
pursued by numerous developed and developing countries alike. 
With greater central bank independence and the associated reduced incentives by this institution 
to deviate from pre-announced policies, the incentive of economic agents to closely monitor the actions of 
the central bank and macroeconomic conditions more generally should be reduced.  Consequently, if 
central bank independence is effective, one of the metrics along which one should be able to quantify this 
success is via its effect on the degree of information rigidity associated with the expectations formation 
process of economic agents.  Because our approach allows us to directly quantify the latter, it provides a 
novel dimension to assess the efficacy of this institutional characteristic.  To quantify the degree of 
central bank autonomy, we use the measure constructed by Arnone et al. (2007).  Each country’s score, 
between 0 and 1, reflects a combination of the degree of political autonomy (which measures the 
involvement of the government in selecting governors and directors of the central bank as well as the 
ability of the central bank to implement its desired policies without government approval) and economic 
autonomy (which measures operational autonomy, such as how involved the central bank is in purchasing 
government debt) as of 2003.  The twelve countries in our Consensus Economics data vary substantially 
in terms of their scores, with Japan having the lowest rating of 0.44 (driven mainly by a very low political 
autonomy rating) while Sweden, Switzerland and France have the highest scores (0.94).
26  The U.S. has 
the fourth lowest rating in this sample of countries (tied with Norway) primarily because of a low political 
autonomy score. 
  To quantify the effect of central bank independence on the expectations formation, we regress our 
country-specific estimate of the coefficient on forecast revisions (as in Figure 2) on each country’s central 
bank independence rating.  Figure 5 presents a scatter plot of these data.  There is a strong positive 
relationship between central bank independence and the country-specific estimate of the coefficient on 
forecast revisions, although Japan appears to be a clear outlier because of its central bank’s weak political 
independence.  Using a Huber robust regression, which controls for outliers, we can reject the null of no 
relationship between central bank independence and information rigidity at standard levels of statistical 
significance.  However, the quantitative implications of central bank independence for the expectations 
formation process are likely to be limited: given the estimated slope, if the U.S. were to achieve the same 
level of central bank independence as Sweden, the change in information rigidity would be equivalent to 
an increase in the average duration between information updates of half a month in the context of sticky-
information models.   
 
                                                      
26 Countries in the Euro-area do not have the same ratings because of the different procedures they use in 
determining who will be appointed to the ECB governing board, among other political autonomy factors. 26 
 
4.2.3   Inflation targeting  
Another policy which has received particular attention is inflation targeting, or the official commitment 
by a central bank to achieving a numerical target for the inflation rate over some time horizon.  This 
mechanism, if credible, should lead to a reduction in both the level and the volatility of inflation.  The 
latter implies that, with increased stability, economic agents should devote fewer resources to forecasting 
inflation.  As a result, an implication of credible inflation-targeting regimes should be increased 
inattention to inflation on the part of forecasters, thereby generating “anchored” expectations.  For 
example, in an extreme case of perfect targeting, all volatility in the inflation rate would be eliminated 
and therefore economic agents should not allocate any attention to this variable.  
However, previous work has had to rely on indirect methods to assess the anchoring of 
expectations.  For example, Levin et al. (2004) find that in countries without an explicit inflation target, 
private sector inflation forecasts at horizons up to 10 years are significantly correlated with a three‐year 
moving average of lagged inflation, but this correlation is largely absent from the five IT countries in their 
sample.  Similarly, Gürkaynak et al. (2006) find that long-horizon market-based inflation forecasts were 
invariant to domestic economic news in the UK and Sweden after these countries adopted inflation-
targeting, but that this was not the case in the UK prior to adopting inflation-targeting or in the U.S., 
which has never officially adopted an inflation target  While indicative of a qualitative effect of inflation-
targeting, these methods cannot directly assess the quantitative implications of inflation-targeting on the 
expectations formation process.  Our approach, on the other hand, can readily be applied to study the 
effect of this type of policy on the expectations formation process with a firm theoretical footing,  To do 
so, we can relate ex post inflation forecast errors to ex ante forecast revisions augmented with a time-
dummy for inflation-targeting and an interaction term  
  ,          ,         ∆      ,        ∆      ,          ,         ,            ,   (17) 
where j and t index countries and time,   is the inflation rate,    is a dummy variable equal to one if a 
country targets inflation at time t and zero otherwise, and γ, the coefficient on the interaction term, will 
measure the change in information rigidity associated with inflation targeting, if any.  This specification 
thus allows one to assess not just the possibility that inflation-targeting affects the expectations formation 
process but also quantify the effect of the policy in terms of its effects on the degree of information 
rigidity.   
Within our cross-country sample, there is a set of countries who became unambiguous inflation 
targeters over the course of time sample: the Bank of Canada officially adopted inflation-targeting in 
February of 1991, the Bank of England in October of 1992, the Swedish Riksbank in Janurary of 1993, 27 
 
the Spanish Banco de Espana in January of 1995 and the Norwegian Norges Bank in March of 2001.
27  
However, other countries in the dataset are close to being inflation-targeting regimes.  For example, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) has an official inflation target of less than, but close to, 2% a year but, 
because it also has other objectives, is not as clear a case of an inflation-targeting regime as the first 
group.  If the ECB is included as an inflation-targeting regime, then all of the countries joining the Euro-
area in 1999 can be viewed as adopting an inflation target.  Other countries are also sometime considered 
de facto inflation targeters.  Germany, prior to the Euro, and Switzerland have been officially targeting 
monetary aggregates since the late 1970s, but Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) argue that they should best 
be thought of as hybrid inflation-targeting regimes.  Similarly, while the Federal Reserve is legally 
subject to the dual mandate and has never officially acknowledged an official inflation target, it is 
frequently viewed as a de facto inflation-targeting regime.
28  In light of the de jure versus de facto 
distinction, we consider three definitions of a country targeting inflation: i) narrow which covers only 
countries officially declaring inflation targeting; ii)  broad which includes countries in the narrow 
definition and countries implementing inflation targeting de facto (i.e., Euro area, USA, Germany and 
Switzerland); iii) intermediate which consists of countries in the narrow definition and countries in the 
Euro area.
29 
Results reported in Table 7 suggest that there is no robust evidence that inflation targeting leads 
to greater information rigidity with respect to the inflation rate, regardless of whether we apply a narrow 
or broad definition of inflation-targeting.  While the point estimates of γ are consistently positive, such 
that inflation-targeting leads to higher degrees of inattention, none are statistically different from zero at 
the five percent level.  Only in the case of the intermediate definition, i.e. including official inflation-
targeting regimes and the ECB, is the estimate significant at the ten percent level.  Importantly, the point 
estimates of γ are all small, on the order of 0.1.  This finding implies that, even if these coefficients were 
statistically significant, the implied effect on informational rigidities would not be economically large.  As 
a result, there is little evidence that inflation-targeting has had important effects on the expectations 
formation process among these countries.
30     
                                                      
27 See Little and Romano (2008) and Roger (2010) for detailed lists of inflation-targeting countries.   
28 For example, a special survey question in the 2007Q4 Survey of Professional Forecasters asked respondents 
whether they believed that the FOMC had an unofficial inflation target.  Approximately half of the respondents 
answered yes.  
29 The only country which does not qualify as inflation-targeting at some point in time under the broad definition is 
Japan.  However, even this case is ambiguous: Little and Romano (2008) classify Japan as a hybrid inflation-targeter 
as of March 2006. 
30 There are several reasons why our results differ from previous findings.  First, we focus on relatively short-run 
forecasting horizons, while Levin et al. (2004) and Gürkaynak el al (2006) emphasize the effects of inflation-
targeting on long-run inflation expectations.  Second, Capistran and Ramos-Francia (2010) argue that the full effect 
of inflation-targeting on expectations, which they measure via dispersion of forecasts, is not observed until three 
years after implementation, whereas we assume that the effect is immediate.  Nonetheless, our results are consistent 28 
 
4.3  State-Dependence in informational rigidities 
Figure 4 documents important low-frequency time variation in the degree of information rigidity for the 
U.S. consistent with the large changes in macroeconomic volatility observed over this time period.  This 
finding points to the possibility that the acquisition of processing of information may be more state-
dependent than commonly assumed.  In this section, we investigate whether informational rigidities 
exhibit state dependence over the course of the business cycle as well as in response to a large, visible 
shock at the aggregate level.   
4.3.1.   Information rigidity over the business cycle 
Our results in the previous section indicate that calm times are associated with stronger informational 
rigidities. In light of this evidence, one may expect that recessions, as periods of increased volatility, 
should be times when economic agents update and process information faster than in expansions since the 
(relative) cost of ignoring macroeconomic shocks in recession rises. Gorodnichenko (2008), for example, 
shows in a theoretical model that the acquisition of information endogenously increases shortly after the 
occurrence of an aggregate shock as economic agents face increased uncertainty about the current state of 
the economy and consequently find it beneficial to devote more resources to learning about current 
macroeconomic conditions.  Using estimates of   computed for each quarter separately as in the previous 
section, we consider the following econometric specification 
      ∑       
     
           ,   (18) 
where   
    is a dummy variable equal to one in the first quarter of each recession, as identified by the 
NBER, and zero otherwise.  By varying index  , we construct a sequence of estimated    which may be 
interpreted as an impulse response of informational rigidities to a recession. To smooth the path of 
coefficients   , we fit a polynomial distributed lag model with the polynomial order equal to 4 and  
  2 0 .  Figure 6 shows the path of the estimated    over four years after the economy slides into a 
recession. We assume that the economy starts at an average level of information rigidity which is equal to 
   . At the start of a recession, informational rigidities are and remain relatively high.  However, as time 
passes, informational rigidities become less severe to the point where we cannot reject the null of FIRE 
one to two years after the start of the recession. The degree of information rigidity stays low about two 
years and then it starts to recover to the level observed before the start of a recession.  
These dynamics of information rigidity pose a challenge for popular models of informational 
frictions such as the sticky information and imperfect information models. In both types of models the 
choice of frequency of updates or allocation of attention is made given the “average” behavior of the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
with Dovern et al. (2010), who rely on dispersion of forecasts and find, that central bank independence plays a more 
important role in anchoring expectations than inflation targeting among a similar set of countries.  29 
 
economy rather than a specific contingency. Agents in these models do not reoptimize every period how 
much attention should be allocated to tracking macroeconomic conditions and the degree of information 
rigidity does not vary over the business cycle.  Accounting for the business-cycle variation in information 
rigidity observed in Figure 6 will require models with state-dependent acquisition of information, such as 
Gorodnichenko (2008), to qualitatively generate variation of informational rigidities over the business 
cycle and, more generally, in response to aggregate shocks.
31   
4.3.2.   The 9/11 Attacks 
Both models of informational rigidities considered in section 2 imply that the current mean forecast is a 
weighted average of the previous mean forecast and the current full-information rational expectation 
forecast, where the weights used in computing the average current forecast in the classical formulations of 
these models are fixed and thus the diffusion of information is largely time-dependent.  For example, 
under the sticky-information model of Reis (2006), if firms face a fixed cost to acquiring new 
information, then information updates will be infrequent and time-dependent if no new information can 
be acquired without paying the fixed cost.  But if a large shock occurs which is visible to economic 
agents, this would induce a state-dependent response and synchronized updating of information as in a 
state-dependent imperfect information model of Gorodnichenko (2008).  As a result, the degree of 
information rigidity should be much lower after a large and visible shock than during normal periods.   
  The time period of our analysis includes one such unambiguously visible and economically 
potent shock: the attacks of September 11
th, 2001.  As shown in Figure 7, the 9/11 attacks were followed 
by very large downward revisions to U.S. macroeconomic forecasts.  For example, in the survey done in 
August 2001, the consensus forecast for the growth rate of the year-on-year real GDP for 2002Q1 was 
approximately 2%.  In the special October forecasts of professional forecasters organized by Consensus 
Economics in response to the September 11
th attacks, the consensus forecast for the same time period was 
revised down to -0.5%.  Forecasts of industrial production were similarly substantially lowered as a result 
of the attacks.  However, by February 2002, forecasters had raised their projected growth rates of real 
GDP back up substantially whereas forecasts of industrial projection growth remained very similar to the 
initial post-9/11 forecasts.  The latter points to a rapid adjustment of expectations in line with the FIRE 
assumption, whereas the former actually points to overshooting expectations. 
                                                      
31 The substantial decrease in information rigidity during recessions could also be consistent with models in which 
agents have ambiguity aversion, as in Epstein and Schneider (2008) and Ilut (2010).  In these models, rational agents 
face uncertainty about the true data generating process and place more weight on the less favorable data generating 
processes.  As a result, these models point to information rigidity being insensitive to good news and decreasing 
strongly in response to bad news, such as recessions. 30 
 
  To quantitatively assess whether the degree of information rigidity varied during the periods 
immediately following the 9/11 attacks, we create a dummy variable (It
9/11) equal to one in the fourth 
quarter of 2001 and the first two quarters of 2002.  We then consider the following specification 
  ,          ,         ∆      ,       ∆    ,         
 /          
 /            , , .    (19) 
The coefficient γ on the interaction term of forecast revisions and the 9/11 dummy indicates the difference 
in the degree of information rigidity associated with the forecast revisions during these three quarters.  
Results from applying this method to U.S. professional forecasters for those macroeconomic variables 
available since 1968 as well as the estimates using the larger set of variables from 1982 are presented in 
Table 8 (columns (1)-(4)) as well as results from applying this test to the cross-country data-set, pooled 
across all countries, variables, and forecasting horizons (columns (5) and (6)).  In each case, the 
coefficient γ is negative and statistically significant, indicating that the degree of information rigidity was 
lower during the forecast revisions following the 9/11 attacks, as expected in the face of a large and 
visible shock.  In fact, point estimates of   are, if anything, larger in absolute value than the point 
estimates of  , so that the forecast revisions can be characterized as either FIRE or even overshooting 
expectations in the case of the U.S.
32  Thus, consistent with the predictions of state-dependent models of 
informational rigidities, large and highly visible economic shocks will lead to much more rapid 
adjustment of expectations than during run-of-the-mill periods.  The fact that our empirical approach can 
identify and differentiate between these types of forecast revisions lends further credence to the notion 
that informational frictions are the source of the underlying rigidity in the expectations formation process.  
V Conclusion 
Building from the predictions of models of informational rigidities, we provide a new test of the null of 
full-information rational expectations which is informative about the economic significance of departures 
from the null as well as the models that can account for these departures.  The core of the proposed 
approach is a tight theoretical link between ex post mean forecast errors and ex ante mean forecast 
revisions. Applying this approach to professional forecasters in the U.S. and other industrialized 
countries, we document widespread rejections of full-information rational expectations in exactly the 
direction predicted by models of informational rigidities.  Consistent with these models, when one takes 
into account forecast revisions, other macroeconomic variables lose much of their ability to predict 
forecast errors.  One interpretation of our results is that commonly observed rejections of the null of full-
information rational expectations most likely reflect deviations from full-information rather than 
departures from rational expectations.  The estimates also point to economically significant estimates of 
informational rigidities, thereby providing support for the recent body of work studying the integration of 
                                                      
32 Similar results obtain if we focus on U.S. forecasts in the Consensus Economics data. 31 
 
informational frictions into macroeconomic models.  In addition, our approach can shed light on how best 
to model the expectations formation process: we document a variety of evidence indicating that 
professional forecasters can adequately be modeled via imperfect information models. 
  While we have focused primarily on professional forecasters, this approach can be applied to 
other economic agents.  For example, we document qualitatively similar results using the inflation 
forecasts from the Michigan Survey of Consumers as well as with the inflation forecasts extracted from 
financial market prices.  The former could be extended to study the properties of consumer forecasts of 
other macroeconomic variables to assess which model best characterizes the expectations formation 
process of consumers.  With financial markets, one could also go beyond implied inflation expectations to 
assess the importance of informational rigidities using exchange rate and commodity futures prices.   
Beyond these types of agents, our approach is also well-suited to study informational rigidities on the part 
of central banks.  The Greenbook forecasts of the Federal Reserve, for example, include multiple 
forecasting horizons for a wide range of macroeconomic variables.  Assessing the nature and degree of 
informational frictions faced by the U.S. central bank could help interpret the historical experience and 
have implications for optimal policy.  In short, our approach can shed new light on the nature of the 
expectations formation process for different economic agents, as well as quantify the importance of these 
informational rigidities.   
  In addition, one can apply our approach to study the implications of different policies on the 
expectations formation process.  For example, we document that the Great Moderation, frequently 
attributed to the monetary policy changes enacted by Volcker, was associated with a pronounced and 
persistent increase in the degree of information rigidity for professional forecasters.  This finding suggests 
a new mechanism through which, along with increased risk-taking behavior on the part of financial 
market participants, the Great Moderation may have played a role in generating the Great Recession.  
Similarly, our empirical specification can help quantify the effect of policy changes on the expectations 
formation process, thereby providing a more theoretically grounded notion of otherwise vague concepts 
such as “anchored” expectations.  For example, we provide evidence that central bank independence has 
had a discernible impact on the expectations formation process among industrialized countries, whereas 
the adoption of inflation-targeting regimes has had little to no effect on the estimated degree of 
information rigidity among professional forecasters, thereby casting doubt on the quantitative importance 
of this policy for expectations.  Importantly, this approach can be applied to study a wide variety of other 
policies such as exchange rate regimes or extended to developing countries and thereby shed new light on 
one of the key mechanisms via which these policies are supposed to affect dynamics, namely through the 
expectations formation process.   
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Table 1. Tests of the Inflation Expectations Process 
  Additional Control:      
 








the log of 





  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5) 
   
  Panel A:      ,          ,              ,                   
Constant  -0.18 -0.02 0.05 -0.12  2.35*** 
  (0.28) (0.26)  (0.29) (0.26) (0.64) 
      ,   0.07 -0.26*  0.23**  0.05  0.22** 
  (0.09) (0.15)  (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) 
Additional Control:        0.29**  -0.15**  1.73**  -0.52*** 
   (0.14)  (0.07)  (0.83)  (0.12) 
              
Observations  163  162    162  163    163 
R-squared  0.005 
    0.064    0.050    0.035    0.282 
  
 
Panel B:       ,          ,                ,            ,                   
Constant  0.04  -0.01  0.25  0.03  1.77*** 
  (0.15) (0.21)  (0.23) (0.15) (0.52) 
      ,            ,   1.23** 1.21**  1.23** 1.17** 1.02** 
  (0.50) (0.49)  (0.51) (0.50) (0.48) 
Additional Control:        0.01  -0.04  0.63  -0.28*** 
   (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.72)  (0.07) 
              
Observations  157  157    157  157    157 
R-squared  0.195 
    0.189    0.197    0.194    0.282 
 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates for the specified equations at the top of each panel.  The 
additional controls (z) are lagged by one quarter.   Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 36 
 












(1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Forecast revision  0.448*  0.820*** 0.616**  1.023*** 
(0.245) (0.202) (0.228)  (0.250) 
Sample 1969-2010  1969-2010  1969-2010  1969-2010 
Observations 83  83  83  83 
 
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (10) using inflation forecasts from the 
Livingston Survey of Professional Forecasters.  Columns (1)-(3) report estimates using 
subsets of the forecasters while column (4) reports estimates using all forecasters in the 
survey.  All estimates are done by OLS with Newey-West HAC standard errors in 
parentheses.  ***, **, * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
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Table 3. Properties of inflation forecasts 
 
  Panel A: Comparison of Mean Squared Error (MSE) 













 (1)    (2)    (3) 
MSE  1.190   2.437  1.429 
  (0.212)   (0.561)  (0.211) 
p-value of equality    -    0.039  0.426 
          
Observations 112    112    112 
          
  Panel B: Predictability of ex post CPI inflation   ,    
 (1)    (2)    (3) 
        
SPF,     ,     0.750**    0.957*** 0.777* 
  (0.364)   (0.281)  (0.409) 
MSC,     ,     0.139     0.148 
  (0.310)     (0.319) 
FIN,     ,        -0.040  -0.037 
     (0.270)  (0.283) 
          
R-squared  0.297    0.277    0.285 
Observations  111    111    111 
 
Notes: In Panel A, figures in parentheses are the standard errors of the MSE estimates. The last row in 
Panel A reports the p-value of the t-test of equality of MSE for SPF and an alternative source of forecasts. 
In Panel B, standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels.  
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Table 4. Information rigidity in inflation forecasts across surveys. 
 
  Instrumental variable regression 













 (1)    (2)    (3) 
     
Forecast revision  1.255** 0.738*** 2.013* 
  (0.486) (0.194) (1.069) 
s.e.e.  1.155 1.258  1.651 
Observations  111    111    111 
     
First stage     
Oil price shock  1.964 2.674    1.340 
  (0.496) (0.458)    (0.575) 
R
2  0.283 0.383    0.104 
F-stat  15.707 34.092    5.421 
 
Notes: The table reports estimated specifications (10) with inflation forecasts. The dependent variable is 
the ex post mean forecast error. Newey-West robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 
significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. Panel B reports the first stage fit. The instrumental variable is 
oil price shocks which are residuals from projecting changes in the oil prices on its own two lags.  
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Table 5. Pooled Estimates of the Expectations Formation Process 
Dependent variable 
Forecast error 


























  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8)  (9) 
    
Panel A 
 
Forecast revision  0.387**  0.382** 0.307***  0.653***  0.653*** 0.634***    0.690*** 0.635*** 0.512*** 
∆         (0.178) (0.177)  (0.118)  (0.188) (0.188) (0.134)    (0.143) (0.139) (0.072) 
               
Observations  3,240 3,240 3,240    5,793 5,793 5,793    22,341  22,341  22,341 
R-squared  0.019 0.018 0.129    0.030 0.032 0.080    0.047 0.043 0.234 
                 
   Panel  B   
         0.421**  0.429**  0.359**  0.651*** 0.670*** 0.631***    0.721*** 0.663*** 0.525*** 
 (0.173)  (0.174)  (0.111)  (0.179) (0.179) (0.154)    (0.140) (0.131) (0.106) 
           -0.481**  -0.530*** -0.483***  -0.576*** -0.506**  -0.491**    -0.782*** -0.736*** -0.541*** 
 (0.171)  (0.184)  (0.074)  (0.181) (0.202) (0.180)    (0.119) (0.096) (0.082) 
                 
p-value (      0   0.135 0.234 0.257   0.258 0.104 0.207    0.073 0.233 0.625 
Observations  3,240 3,240 3,240   5,793 5,793 5,793    22,341  22,341  22,341 
R-squared  0.022 0.023 0.135   0.032 0.039 0.086    0.0731  0.046 0.234 
 
Notes: The table reports estimated specifications (10) and (12) in Panels A and B respectively. Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors are in 
parentheses in columns (1), (2), (4), (5), (7), (8).  Robust standard errors clustered by forecasted variable are in parentheses in columns (3), (6) and 
(9). Fixed effects in columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8) and (9) are for each combination of country, variable, and forecast horizon. Time dummies in 
columns (3), (6) and (9) are for each time period (calendar quarter). ***, **, * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
  
  40 
 
Table 6. The Macroeconomic Determinants of Informational Rigidities 
Dependent variable: 
estimated coefficient on 
forecast revisions for 
country-variable pairs 
Revisions in data releases as  
a measure of noise 
  Forecast disagreement as  






regression   OLS  Robust 
regression 
(1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) 
Persistence of Series,   ,   -0.802*** -0.833*** -0.628*   -1.068*** -1.146*** 
  (0.282) (0.248) (0.317)    (0.269) (0.354) 
Noise-Signal Ratio,   ,   0.153  0.464** 0.506*    0.871** 0.790* 
  (0.304) (0.201) (0.255)    (0.425) (0.476) 
Observations  60 56 60    48 48 
R-squared  0.153  0.326     0.196  
 
Note: The table reports estimated specification (16). The persistence of each series    ,   is estimated as 
the sum of AR(4) coefficients. In columns (1)-(3), standard deviation of the difference between first and 
final data releases is taken as a measure of noise in the series. In columns (4) and (5), the average standard  
deviation of forecast disagreement is taken as a measure of noise in the series. In column (1), four 
observations are identified as outliers: consumption growth rates for Italy, France, Germany and Japan. 
These outliers are dropped in estimation in column (2). In columns (3) and (5), robust S-regression is run 
with no dummies for outliers and all available observations included. Robust standard errors are in 
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Table 7. Informational rigidities and inflation targeting. 
Dependent variable 
Forecast error 











Euro area, 1999-present 









  OLS FE    OLS FE    OLS  FE 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
∆    ,     0.200* 0.168  0.121  0.088  0.139  0.119 
 (0.111)  (0.105)  (0.109)  (0.107) (0.130)  (0.135) 
∆    ,             0.062 0.057  0.177*  0.137  0.114  0.078 
 (0.140)  (0.144)  (0.105)  (0.095) (0.153)  (0.151) 
Observations  4,541 4,541    4,541 4,541    4,541  4,541 
R-squared  0.019 0.015    0.018 0.030    0.019  0.029 
 
Notes: The table reports estimated specification (17).     is the dummy variable equal to one if a country 
targets inflation in a given time period and zero otherwise. In columns (1) and (2) the set of inflation 
targeting countries includes only countries with an explicit mandate to target inflation. In columns (3) and 
(4), the set of inflation countries is augmented with countries in the Euro area since the European Central 
Bank admits an inflation target. In columns (5) and (6), the set of inflation countries is further augmented 
with the USA, Germany and Switzerland. Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
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Table 8. 9/11. 
Dependent variable 
Forecast error 















OLS FE    OLS FE    OLS FE 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
∆        0.414*** 0.407***   0.713*** 0.732***  0.736*** 0.681*** 
  (0.049) (0.045)   (0.139) (0.148)  (0.060) (0.058) 
∆           
 /    -0.894**  -0.851**   -1.041*** -1.011***  -0.826*** -0.828*** 
(0.222) (0.219)   (0.274) (0.267)  (0.129) (0.117) 
p-value (      0   < 0.01  < 0.01    < 0.01  < 0.01    0.467  0.209 
Observations  3,240 3,240   5,793 5,793   22,341  22,341 
R-squared  0.022 0.021   0.035 0.036   0.051 0.047 
 
Notes: The table reports estimated specification (19).    
 /   is a dummy variable equal to one in 2001Q4, 
2002Q1, and 2002Q2 and zero otherwise. p-value (      0  shows the probability value for the null 
that the coefficients on ∆       and ∆           
 /   sum up to zero. Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard 
errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
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Figure 1: Inflation Forecasts from Professional Forecasters, Consumers and Financial Markets 
 
Note: The figure plots the one-year ahead CPI forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, the 

















































Figure 2:  Country-Specific Estimates of Informational Rigidities 
 
Notes: The figure plots estimated coefficient β on forecast revisions in specification (10) for each country 
separately. Each circle presents a point estimate for a given country and whiskers show the 95% 
confidence interval. The solid red line is the point estimate of the coefficient on forecast revisions in 
specification (10) on pooled (across countries) sample with the shaded region showing the associated 95% 
confidence interval. All standard errors are Driscoll and Kraay (1998). CA = Canada, CH = Switzerland, 
DE = Germany, FR = France, IT = Italy, JP = Japan, ND = Netherlands, NW = Norway, SP = Spain, SW 
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Figure 3:  Estimates of Information Rigidity by Macroeconomic Variable 
Panel A: U.S. SPF Variables Available 1968-2010 
 
Panel B: U.S. SPF Variables Available 1982-2010 
 
Panel C: Variables Available in Cross-Country Panel Data 
   
Notes: The figure plots estimated coefficient β on forecast revisions (left column) and macroeconomic variables (right column) in 
specification (10)  for each variable separately. Each circle presents a point estimate for a given country and whiskers show the 95% 
confidence interval. The solid red line is the point estimate of the coefficient on forecast revisions in specification (10) on pooled 
(across variables) sample with the shaded region showing the associated 95% confidence interval.  All standard errors are Driscoll and 
Kraay (1998). GY = real GDP growth rate, HS = Housing starts, IP = Growth rate of industrial production index, DEFL = Inflation rate for 
GDP deflator, UE = Unemployment rate, 3TB = 3 month treasure bill interest rate, AAA = Interest rate on AAA debt, CPI = Inflation rate for 
the consumer price index, C = Consumption growth rate, GF = growth rate of federal government consumption expenditures, GS = Growth 
rate of state government consumption expenditures, NRI = Growth rate of non-residential investment; RI = growth rate of residential 
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Figure 4:  Information Rigidity and the Great Moderation 
 
Notes: the figure plots the time series of two variables. The first is the standard deviation of the U.S. real 
GDP growth rate (annualized) over a five year moving window (red dash line; right axis). The second is 
the smoothed coefficient βt on forecast revisions in specification (10) estimated for each quarter 
separately on the SPF data (black thick solid line; left axis). The shaded region is the 95% confidence 
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Figure 5: Central Bank Independence and Information Rigidity 
 
Notes: The figure plots estimated coefficient β on forecast revisions in specification (10) for each country 
separately against the Central Bank Independence Score constructed in Arnone et al. (2007). Each circle 
represents a country. The solid red line is the fitted line from the Huber robust regression. CA = Canada, 
CH = Switzerland, DE = Germany, FR = France, IT = Italy, JP = Japan, ND = Netherlands, NW = 
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Figure 6:  Information Rigidity during a Business Cycle 
 
Notes: the figure plots the response of the coefficient βt on forecast revisions in specification (10)  
estimated for each quarter separately on the SPF data. The response is estimated as in specification (18). 
The response is normalized to be at the average value of the coefficient βt one period before a recession 
starts. The shaded region is the 95% confidence interval. The horizontal, thin, dashed line shows the 
average value of the coefficient βt. The vertical, thin, dashed line shows the time when economy moves 
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Figure 7:  Forecasts of U.S. Production Before and After the September 11
th, 2001 Attacks: 
Panel A: Real GDP Growth Rate 
 
 
Panel B: Industrial Production Growth Rate 
 
 
Note: The figure plots consensus forecasts of real GDP growth rates (top panel) and industrial production 
growth rates (bottom panel) from thee different surveys of professional forecasters by Consensus 

































































































Appendix Figure 1:  Noise-Signal Ratios and Estimated Coefficients on Forecast Revisions
 
Note: The table plots the noise/signal ratio for each country/variable pair (horizontal axis) where noise is 
measured using the size of revisions to the data, as discussed in section 4.1.  The vertical axis indicates 
the coefficient on forecast revisions from estimating (15) for each country/macroeconomic variable pair.  
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